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SUA SPONTE
By The Honorable Marvin B. Steinberg,
Tracy K. Garapolo and Gloria A. Worch

Upon taking their oath of office, trial judges assume the litigants to formulate rules based on categories of circumduty of conducting trials through a fair process calculated to stances which will permit or preclude retrial."' The Court
ascertain the truth while achieving justice within reasonable has stated, however, that when deciding whether a manifest
costs. Furthermore, judges are expected to remain fair and necessity existed, an appellate court must examine the trial
impartial in both their conduct and rulings. In large part, the as "viewed in the light of the particular problem confronting
motions and requests of counsel prompt the rulings judges the trial judge." '6 Furthermore, an appellate court should
make prior to, during, and following the actual trial. None- "accord the highest decree of respect to the trial judge's
theless, in certain situations judges have the authority to act evaluation" regarding the manifest necessity to declare
mistrial.7
sua sponte.
The term "sua sponte" means taking action of one's
Whether upon request or sua sponte, the decision to
"own will or motion voluntarily, without prompting or declare or not to declare a mistrial in a criminal case requires
suggestion."2 In court proceedings, "sua sponte" refers to the trial judge to consider well established double jeopardy
a trial judge acting, without being requested, on his or her principles, which, inter alia, dictate that where a trial is
own volition. A sua sponte ruling by a judge is appropriate needlessly aborted, the defendant cannot be retried.' Maryprovided such action is called for by a manifest necessity.
land, however, like the federal courts, has not adopted a clear
The parameters of sua sponte conduct have presented formula for determining when there is a manifest necessity
difficulties for trial judges in recent years, with appellate for the declaration of a mistrial. As a result, the courts may
courts continuously defining and redefining what constitutes differ in their analyses regarding whether a particular occura manifest necessity. On the one hand, the risk of a reversal rence at a trial warrants such declaration.
looms when a judge fails to act under circumstances which
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has expressly derequire judicial intervention. On the other hand, if the judge clined to place significant limits on the capacity of trial
acts when he or she should not have acted, the result would judges to declare a mistrial on their own volition in a criminal
be the barring of a subsequent criminal trial on double case. In Crutchfieldv. State,9 the court of appeals reversed
jeopardy grounds, and a possible reversal on other grounds a decision by the court of special appeals which attempted to
in a civil case. The purpose of this article is to discuss when restrict the trial court's power to declare a mistrial sua
there is or is not manifest necessity in various contexts and sponte. During the trial in Crutchfield, the substance of
to identify useful guidelines for the trial judge in determining statements made by the defendant was admitted into evidence
despite the fact that the statements were made during a
when such conduct is appropriate.
custodial interrogation without the defendant having been
I. Manifest Necessity
advised of herMirandarights. The trial judge recognized the
A "judge has the inherent discretion to declare a mistrial potential damage to the defendant's case and advised counsel
sua sponte or to declare it pursuant to the State's motion, to move for amistrial. Defense counsel declinedto do so, and
[and] he or she may declare a mistrial over the defendant's further stated his intentions "to move for a dismissal if the
objection or without the defendant's acquiescence." 3 A trial court declared a mistrial without [the defendant's] conjudge has "the authority to discharge a jury from giving any sent."' 0 The trial judge declared a mistrial sua sponte, over
verdict, whenever, in [his or her] opinion, taking all the the objection of the defense.
On appeal, the court of special appeals held that there
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of the public justice would was no indication of "a manifest.., necessity for the trial
M
judge to have aborted the trial."" Furthermore, the intermeotherwise be defeated."
In addressing the issue of manifest necessity, the Su- diate court concluded that the defendant should be the person
preme Court has "explicitly declined the invitations of to determine "whether a mistrial is necessary to protect [his
4 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24.3

or her] interest."' 2 Reasoning that "great deference should
be given [to the defendant's] determination as to whether his
own interests would be better served by aborting the trial or
by submittinghis fate to thejury that is already impaneled,"' 3
the court of special appeals overturned the trial court's
decision to declare a mistrial.
The court ofappeals reversed, holding that the trial judge
had properly exercised his authority in declaring a mistrial
under these circumstances, even over the defendant's objection. Rejecting the view expressed by the court of special
appeals which favored deference to the wishes of the defendant, the court of appeals reasoned that the effect of placing
the ultimate determination with the defendant and not the trial
judge would be to render "the trial judge a useless appendage
in the judgmental process of determining whether a mistrial
was manifestly necessary in the interest of public justice."' 4

discretion through inaction as well. Accordingly, appellate
review of such sua sponte conduct or lack thereof may be
warranted.

A. Error in Testimony
The first situation which may warrant a trial court's sua
sponte declaration of a mistrial involves error occurring
when the jurors acquire prejudicial information during a
witness's testimony at trial. In Bailey v. State,'8 three of the
State's witnesses at the defendant's second trial referred to
the first trial during the course of their testimony. Defense
counsel did not object to the first witness's reference to the
previous trial. 9 When the second witness made a similar
20
reference, however, defense counsel requested a mistrial.
The trial judge declined to take such action. Although willing
to give a cautionary instruction, the trial judge expressed
concern that doing so would only emphasize the first trial.2'
When the third witness made a statement regarding the
II. Guidelines
Although there are no rigid federal or state standards for defendant's conviction at the first trial, the trial judge sua
sponte declared a mistrial.2 2 The
explicitly defining manifest necessity, case
declaration of a mistrial was upheld on
law does provide some guidance in deterappeal based upon a finding of manifest
mining when a manifest necessity exists.
important
is
it
principle,
necessity. The court reasoned that "when
As an overriding
istrial
a m,
prejudicial information is acquired by juto keep in mind that "there are [varying]
rors during trial, there is a high risk that
sua
degrees ofnecessity and.. a'high degree'
the prejudicial information will be held
[is required] before concluding that a mis5
against the accused."23
ooo a
trial is appropriate."'
Conversely, other appellate cou rts
need
Before declaring a mistrial, the trial
that, in certain instances, trial
found
have
judge must determine whether an error
their discretion by declaring
abused
courts
that has occurred is so egregious that the
a mistrial sua sponte after the jury heard
defendant cannot continue to have a fair
6
of
showunfairly prejudicial testimony. For exdanger
trial once the error has been committed.'
ample, in United States v. Evers, 24 the
If the trial judge correctly makes such a
to
one
is
defendant was being prosecuted for feddetermination, the requisite manifest neeral income tax evasion. The trial judge
should,
court
and
the
cessity then exists
sua sponte declared a mistrial after one of
sua sponte, abort the trial. By declaring a
the witnesses for the prosecution sugmistrial sua sponte, however, ajudge needs
gested that the source of unreported into be cognizant of the danger of showing
come
might
have
been from campaign contributions. The
bias to one of the parties. Case law has emphasized that a
trial judge should not declare a mistrial if there are less appellate court found that manifest necessity did not exist in
drastic alternatives available to the court. For example, the this situation, concluding that thejudge should have opted to
juror
trial judge should consider the option of giving a curative use a curative instruction to remove any possible
25
remark.
the
from
arisen
have
might
that
prejudice
instruction, as opposed to declaring a mistrial sua sponte, if
B. Error in Jury Instructions
such an instruction can effectively remedy the error. 7
The issue of error may additionally arise in the course of
In many instances, however, no feasible alternative
exists and a trial judge is compelled to declare a mistrial sua the trial judge's presentation of instructions to the jury.
sponte. Sua sponte declarations of a mistrial, based upon Maryland Rule 4-325(a) states that the "court shall give
manifest necessity, have been upheld in a variety of circum- instructions to the jury.. . ." (emphasis added). Advisory
stances. The situations in which a trial judge must decide instructions are required, however, "only where a request for
6
whether to declare a mistrial include: 1) after some testimony such instructions is made,'2 providing there is an evidentiary
27
mistakenly comes in that is highly prejudicial to the defen- and legal basis for the instruction. In Stanley v. State the
dant; 2) following the presentation of improper instructions trial judge asked counsel if there were any requests for
to the jury; 3) plain error; 4) a hung jury; 5) unfair prejudice instructions. Because neither counsel made such a request,
against the accused; and 6) absent witnesses. To avoid the court of special appeals held that the defendant "waived
reversal, the trial judge must guard against abusing his or her his right to have the jury instructed . . . and cannot . . .
24.3/U. Bait. L.F. - 5

By declaring

sponte
judge
to be
cogniztml of the
ing bit
of the parties.

complain about the absence of such instruction."2 8 How- resulted... ."I "Any error, once recognized, may be called
ever, in view of Glover v. State,29 it appears that had the trial plain error, and unless it can be held to be harmless,
it must
judge not asked counsel, unlike Stanley where such a request be considered as material to the rights of the accused. 38
was made, proceeding without any instruction could well be
"The plain error rule evolved as an exception to the
reversible error.
general rule that points or questions not raised at trial will not
Jury instructions are proper when they are "articulated be considered on appeal."3' 9 Prior to 1825,
the court of
fairly and impartially."3 "[W]hen the instructions are lack- appeals was required to examine any error
in the record from
ing in some vital detail or convey some prejudicial or the trial court, regardless of whether
or not such error was
confusing message,... the ability of the jury to discharge its brought to the attention of the trial judge. 4°
Following an
duty of returning a true verdict based on the evidence is 1825 legislative enactment, the court of
appeals
possessed
impaired."'3' In State v. Hutchinson,32 for example, plain authority to examine only those issues
which had been
error occurred when the failure to give a not guilty option, adjudicated at the trial level. 4
Although that statutory
excluded the possibility of a not guilty verdict, although the principal is strictly followed in civil actions,
appellate courts
instructions did include various degrees of guilty verdicts.33 have greater flexibility in criminal
matters to address issues
A trial judge is obligated to present a correct instruction not previously raised at the trial .42
Such flexibility has been
to thejury even though atechnically incorrect instruction was attributed to the need to protect the
defendant's rights in
requested by counsel. In Glover v. State,34 a question arose situations "where errors
are likely to have more serious
as to whether or not a trial judge was obligated to correct a consequences.'4
technically erroneous jury instruction. The defense counsel
Pursuant to the Maryland Rules of Procedure, "the
requested an instruction relating to
appellate court will not decide any issue
"fresh pursuit." The requested instruc[other than subject-matter jurisdiction]
tion specifically dealt with interstate
A trial1
unless it plainly appears by the record to
pursuit, which was in error because the
obligatedi
have been raised in or decided by the
o present trial
matter at hand dealt with intrastate
court .... The rule encourages
pursuit. The trial judge refused to give a correct i
efficient
administration by
istruction "avoiding judicial
the instruction, voicing concern that it
the expense and delay of apmight confuse the jury. Although deto
peals and new trials based on errors that
fense counsel objected, it made no sugeven iugh a
might have been corrected by the trial
gestion ofan instruction on "intrastate"
court. '4 Consequently, the failure of a
pursuit. While it is not error for a trial
Scally
party to raise an issue in a timely manner
judge to refuse to grant a requested
during the course of the trial generally
inco rrect
instruction which may mislead thejury,
constitutes a waiver ofthat issue. 46 Likethe appellate court held that, in a case
wise, the failure to raise an issue to the
ion was
such as the one at bar, the trial judge
appellate court in brief or argument is
should have given the correct instrucred by
usually also deemed a waiver as to the
tion sua sponte, i.e., he should have
issue.47
changed the requested "interstate" inCOUn sel.
- Despite the judicially recognized
struction to "intrastate." 3 Offering
view disfavoring review on appeal of
some guidance, the court ofspecial appeals in Gloverdevised issues not raised at the trial level, the
plain error rule permits
a principle for determining whether a requested jury instruc- an appellate court, upon its own motion and without any
tion is potentially misleading or technically erroneous: "[i]f prompting from counsel, to "take cognizance
of [and corthe premise of the instruction requested by the defendant is rect] any plain error . . . material
to the rights of the
relevant and sanctioned by law, rather than one contrary to defendant" even though there was
no objection made to the
it, a circuit court has an obligation to instruct on the point error at the trial.48 An error may
be classified as material
even if the language of the instruction offered by the defen- if it affects the rights of the accused to a
"fair and impartial
dant is in some respects erroneous. 36
trial. '49 Sua sponte acts of appellate courts are especially
instructive for trial judges because it can safely be assumed
C. Plain Error
that the appellate court, by rendering a sua sponte ruling,
Under the plain error rule, a legal doctrine which may would not only have condoned such
action at trial, but likely
also warrant sua sponte conduct, obvious errors which arise would have deemed it necessary for the
trial judge to have
during the course of a judicial proceeding and which affect raised and ruled on the same issue as well.
the substantive rights of a party "may be considered on
There is no fixed formula to ascertain when plain error
motion for a new trial or on appeal though not raised in [the] has occurred such that it may be addressed on appeal.5 0
trial court if manifest injustice or miscarriage ofjustice has Factors for consideration include "whether the
error was

udge is

the jury
tht
techni

instruct
reques
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arises saying to himself that if the jury in
purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial obvious error.
acquit his client, then he has in the record
not
does
its
wisdom
tactics or the result of bald inattention... [T]hese factors.
reversal."63
appellate
for
ground
a
. are ordinarily inconsistent with circumstances justifying
discretion to correct [plain error]
of
our
"[T]he exercise
an appellate court's intervention."' In deciding whether a
reviewable plain error exists, an appellate court may be should be limited to those cases in which correction is
guided by a three-part test: 1) is there an unobjected-to error necessary to serve the ends of fundamental fairness and
6
readilyapparenton the face of the record?; 2) is the error of substantial justice."' Plain error should "not include bad
not to object to anything done
such aprejudicialnature that "it is material to the rights of guesses by counsel whether or
'65
court.
the
5 2; and 3) is the error "sufficiently serious or
by
undone
left
or
the accused?"
Similarly, the admission of erroneously admitted eviharmful to merit review in the absence of a trial objection?"53
54
Recently in Austin v. State, the court of special appeals dence does not necessarily invoke the plain error rule. "[A]
discussed four factors an appellate court might consider in failure to object to an offer of evidence at the time the offer
determining whether to exercise its discretion in reviewing is made . . . is a waiver upon appeal of any ground of
plain error not raised at the trial level. The first consideration complaint against its admission. "66 At issue in Mack v.
concerns the egregiousness of the error, which does not United States was whether the "trial judge erred by failing
include "mere misstatements of the law."55 A second to intervene sua sponte to assure the exclusion of...
'67
motivation for appellate review involves the impact of the hearsay. Hearsay testimony which was damaging to the
error upon the defendant. The court is likely to review an defendant had been admitted during the trial. The trial judge
recognized the impropriety of the testierror under this second factor "only where
mony and advised defense counsel to ob[the appellate court is] persuaded that the
ject. Counsel offered no objection. The
o
t
errorprobablydid have a crucial bearing
appellate court held that the trial judge did
upon the verdict. 5 6 Furthermore, the
's
not commit "plain error" by not taking
court,
burden is upon the defendant to prove that
P1Yv.AAh1;* ,
further action in reference to the testierror did have an adverse impact. Under
&i.,,U 1I11"y
the third consideration, diligence of counmony.
Maryland Rule 4-323(a) adheres
1
sel, or "the degree of dereliction of the
to this same principle, stating that: "[an
attorney in not making timely objection to
objection to the admission of evidence
an erroneous instruction" may influence
shall be made at the time the evidence is
the appellate court's decision regarding
57
offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds
review. The fourth and final considerfor objection become apparent. Otheration, according to the court, concerns
'68
wise, the objection is waived.
ra
whether the case is a vehicle in which
D. Hung Jury
review is "necessary to serve the ends of
In addition to a trial judge's ability
fundamental fairness and substantial justo declare a mistrial sua sponte based
tice" beyond the concerns of the particu5
upon error, the court may declare a mislar case at hand. "
trial if there is a hungjury. The hung jury
Although the above-mentioned conis
"considered
to
be
the classic example of what constitutes
siderations may influence the appellate court's decision to
a mistrial." 69 The Supreme Court has
for
necessity
manifest
review plain error, "[tihe touchstone remains, as it always
has been, ultimate and unfettered discretion" of the court.59 held "that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadUnfortunately, such a "touchstone" is of limited assistance locked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second
to a trial judge attempting to determine if sua sponte action trial.""
In Hankins v. State,7' the jury had deliberated for
is warranted in a particular instance.
There is a persuasive counter-argument as to why an approximately three hours when it informed the trial judge
appellate court should not always consider a lack of sua that it had not reached a unanimous decision. The judge
sponte action on the part ofa trial judge to be reviewable plain instructed the jury to continue deliberation as requested by
2
error. In his dissent in Hutchinson,' Judge Smith reasoned both counsel. Less than one hour later, the jury made an
that "an appellate court should not take cognizance of 'plain inquiry as to how long it would be required to remain in
73
error' on its own motion if the alleged error was one which deliberation. Although the court and the prosecutor becould be corrected readily if brought to the trial judge's lieved the jury to be deadlocked, defense counsel, objecting
attention."61 Under certain circumstances, it may be part of to the declaration of a mistrial, requested that the jury be
defense counsel's strategy to waive the defendant's constitu- allowed to continue to deliberate after a recess until the
74
tional right to object to errors arising during the course of the following morning. Instead of adopting defense counsel's
trial. 62 "[A]n attorney might very well sit quietly by when an suggestion, the court decided to ask the jury whether it would

al ellate
have
greaterj
n
crimina1 matters
to addrt'ss issues
notpri'viously
ised
at th 'trial
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be able to reach a verdict if given more time." When the jury
responded in the negative, the trial judge declared a mistrial.76 The court of special appeals held that the trial judge
acted within his discretion in deciding that allowing the jury
to continue deliberations would be futile." As a manifest
necessity existed for the trial judge to declare a mistrial in the
appellant's first trial, the doublejeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment did not preclude a retrial. 8
There is no minimum length of time that a jury must
remain in deliberation before a mistrial may be declared.79
When it becomes obvious to the trial judge "that continued
deliberation.., would be futile," then he or she may correctly
declare a mistrial8s0 As a mater of practice, the trial judge
should note for the record the length of the trial and the length
of the jury deliberations. The trial judge should also make
some inquiry as to the likelihood of the jury reaching a
verdict.

the detriment of the accused during the trial, an appellate
court will examine "whether the trial court took appropriate
action to overcome a likelihood of prejudice... .,"I4 How the
trial court handles such a remark may determine whether
there is cause for reversal of the judgment.8" Certainly,
counsel may make an objection to an improper remark if done
so in a timely manner so as to give the court an opportunity
to take corrective measures.
"Generally the prosecutor has an obligation to refrain
from making any remark wiihin the hearing of thejury which
is likely or apt to instigate prejudice against the accused."86
The court should examine a questionable remark for its effect
upon thejury. If thejury was possibly influenced against the
defendant as a result of the remark, then a conviction might
be reversed. To warrant a reversal, "[i]mproper conduct or
remarks made by the state during a prosecution would have
to be a direct and contributing factor that resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant." 7
E. Prejudice
In 1rick v. United States,"8 the defendant sought a
A third category of cases in which appellate courts have reversal of his conviction based upon prosecutorial misconupheld a trial judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial duct that occurred during his trial.8 9 After determining that
based upon manifest necessity occurs
misconduct did occur, the appellate court
when prejudice arises during the course
then considered "the gravity of the misof the trial. Any occurrence which has
conduct, its relationship to the issue of
the potential ofcreating prejudice against
guilt, the effect of any corrective action
the accused may warrant the declaration
a
by the trial judge, and the strength of the
of a mistrial. For example, manifest
government's case." The court went
necessity exists "where ajuror has poson to state that where the defendant has
sibly been biased or the juror's imparfailed to object to the prosecutorial mistiality is questionable." 8 ' A trial court's
imp]A'oper
conduct during the course of the trial, as
declaration of a mistrial was upheld
was the case here, his conviction will be
when the "jurors accidently met four
i
reversed only "if the misconduct so
co-defendants at an elevator [where] the
clearly prejudiced his substantial rights
co-defendants were heavily shackled,
as to jeopardize the fairness and integCOUl
chained together and guarded by a conrity of his trial."'91 The court acknowl8
2
tingent of United States Marshals.
If
edged that when misconduct might rethe potentially prejudicial event is minor
sult in "substantial prejudice, thejudge
or only a quickly passing scene, the trial
should consider convening a bench conjudge should inquire of the jurors individually what, if ference sua sponte, even during argument, to protect a
anything, they saw or heard and if those observations would litigant from prejudice. ' 9 2 The court, however, viewed the
keep them from rendering a fair verdict based only on the particular case subjudice as "hardly a situation so extreme
3
evidence.1
that it required or even warranted intervention by the judge
in the absence of an objection .... 9
Improper Remarks
In Brinandv. Denzik,94 the appellant failed to make a
Prejudice against the accused may arise from improper timely objection to the improper remarks made by the
remarks made during the course of the trial. When an appellee's counsel during closing arguments. 9 Although
improper remark has been made but not objected to by conceding that the remarks in question may have indeed been
opposing counsel, the issue arises as to whether the trial improper, the court ofappeals nonetheless affirmed the lower
judge should take action sua sponte to correct the comment. court's denial of appellant's motion for a new trial. "The
Generally, the answer is "no." However, to be on safe appellant did not ask the trial court to declare a mistrial when
ground, the trial judge should ask counsel for a conference the remarks were made, and did not then or at any time before
out of the presence of the jury to inquire into the prejudicial the jury retired request the court to instruct the jury to
nature of the statement.
disregard them. This being so, the appellant was deemed to
Upon determining that an improper remark was made to have waived her right to object to the verdict." '6 "In the

Prejudice against
th
,cused
may ar,rsefrom
remar):s made
dur, zg the
Se of
the trial
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absence of any further action by appellant [to protect herself prosecution did not constitute a manifest necessity for a
from potential prejudice resulting from the improper re- mistrial." 0 Cornero v. UnitedStates"I set forth the general
marks], there was no duty 7upon the trial court to make further rule regarding the appropriate course of action a trial judge
9
should follow when witnesses are absent from trial. In
reference to the matter.
Case history provides examples of the effect of improper Cornero, the court noted that no previous court had held
remarks made during the course of the trial. For instance, "that, after impanelment of the jury,. . . the failure of the
district attorney to have present sufficient witnesses, or
"[a]n appeal to racial or religious prejudice is improper."
Also improper are "remarks as to the right of appeal and the evidence to prove the offense charged, is an exception to the
operates as a protection
possibility of executive clemency and parole of the defen- rule that the discharge of the jury..,
' 12
dant." 99 "It is improper for the prosecutor to assert his against retrial of the same case." "
In Downum v. UnitedStates, I3I the Supreme Court held,
personal belief or personal conviction as to the guilt of the
accused, if that belief or conviction is predicated upon in a 5-4 decision, that former jeopardy attached when the
anything other than the evidence in the case. .. -100 A prosecution successfully requested that the first jury, which
prosecutor is acting improperly when he or she encourages was already sworn, be discharged because a key witness, in
the jury to consider prior convictions of a defendant in two of the six counts charged against the defendant, was not
present. A second jury was impaneled two days later when
reaching a verdict.''
"[W]hen passion and prejudice are heightened by emo- the case was again called. Although the trial court denied the
tions stirred during wartime, a prosecutor's reference, in his defendant's plea of formerjeopardy, the Supreme Court held
that the plea should have been susclosing argument, to the war as being,
tained. The Court noted that the proswholly irrelevant to any facts or issues
ecution, "allowed the jury to be sein the case," were held to be imrre to take
02
lected and sworn even though one of its
proper. Here, the defendant was on
sponte
ia
key witnesses was absent and had not
trial for allegedly violating a statutory
been found.""l4 Furthermore, the prosprovision which called for the "regisome
cases
ecution could have dismissed the two
tration of certain agents of foreign
1 3
0
counts for which the missing witness
principals."'
The reference by the
basis of a
was needed, and proceeded on the reprosecutor to the "harsh, cruel, murnation by
determij
maining four counts.
derous war" was clearly done to inOther courts, however, have revoke prejudice against the accused.1'
fused to acknowledge the inflexible
The Supreme Court stated in dicta that
rule which states that "the absence of a
CoUrts 2t the trial
"the trial judge should have stopped
witness can never justify the disconcounsel's discourse without waiting
5used his
tinuance of a trial.""' 5 Adhering to
for an objection."' 10 5
such a rule would violate the principles
or her d iscretion.
Conduct
6
set forth in United States v. Perez,"
Manifest necessity for the sua
which provided that the determination
sponte declaration of a mistrial has
of whether there was a manifest necesalso been upheld in a case where the
defendant's conduct displayed such "obvious hostility to the sity for the declaration of a mistrial must be assessed on a
judge's rulings [that it] could not help but influence the case-by-case basis. A situation similar to Downum arose in
jury."'' 6 The appellate court in State v. Brady indicated that United States v. Khait,' where the court held that the
although "the judge had ruled quickly, . . . [he did not act] defendant's second trial was not barred by double jeopardy
without consideration.'107 The trial judge, after assessing the when the first trial ended in a mistrial due to the unavailability
impact of the defendant's conduct upon the jury, believed of a witness. In Khait, a key witness was absent not as a
that there was no alternative other than to declare a mis- result of an oversight of the prosecutor, but rather because of
threats made upon family members ofthe witness in an effort
trial.'0 8
to keep the witness from testifying. The district court
distinguished the case before it from Downum in that the
F. Absent Witnesses
Yet another indication for determining whether a mani- latter case involved fault on the part of the prosecution for
fest necessity for declaring a mistrial exists is whether there "failing to arrange for the witness's presence, whereas in this
are less drastic measures available. "[W]here reasonable case the government had no control" over the witness's
alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible refusal to testify.'' 8
and could cure the problem," the judge should not declare a
G. Abuse of Discretion
mistrial.109
The failure to take action sua sponte may in some cases
It has been held that the absence of a key witness for the

The faili
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may in s
form the

the appellate
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judge a

24.3/U. Bait. L.F. - 9

form the basis of a determination by the appellate courts that
the trial judge abused his or her discretion. In Drummondv.
Drummond,119 for example, the court of special appeals
vacated the lower court's judgment after finding fault with
the inaction of the trial judge. In Drummond, the husband
had filed a complaint for absolute divorce in Maryland, but
Mrs. Drummond received service of the complaint in New
Jersey. According to Maryland Rule 2-321(b)(1), Mrs.
Drummond had sixty days after service to file her answer (as
opposed to the thirty day response time for in-state service).
When Mrs. Drummond did not respond within thirty days, an
order of default was entered against her despite the additional
time allotted to her under the rules. 2 °
Mrs. Drummond requested that the court reconsider the
order of default, stating she was out of state and needed extra
time to retain a lawyer.' 2' She claimed that the order of
default was mailed to her parents' home in Atlantic City
where she no longer "commutted [sic] from.' 1 22 Despite
Mrs. Drummond's claim that she had not received the order
of default in a timely fashion after its entry, her motion was
denied. Mrs. Drummond then filed what appeared to be a
request for reconsideration concerning the error in the time
allotted for her answer. Although two hearings were held
before a master, that particular issue was not addressed.
Accordingly, the trial court granted an absolute divorce.
In vacating this judgment, the court of special appeals
held that "either the motion to set aside the default alone, or
taken together with the motion for reconsideration, contained
sufficient information to alert the trial judge that he needed
to look at the whole record."' 23 Although not citing any
authority for its position, the court believed that the trial
judge "either erred in failing to set aside the default based on
the first motion, or abused his discretion in denying the
motion for reconsideration.' ' 24 Drummond may be construed as placing an obligation upon trial judges to review,
sua sponte, proceedings involving a pro se party for errors
or inconsistencies which would ordinarily be raised by
counsel. What remains to be seen is whether a trial judge is
under such an obligation only in cases where the party is
unable to obtain the assistance of counsel, as in Drummond,
or whether a trial judge must examine a record even where
both parties are assisted by counsel.
III. Conclusion
The decision whether or not to take sua sponte action can
prove to be an extremely difficult one for the trial judge. Not
acting when the judge should have acted could result in a
reversal; acting when he or she should not have acted could
precipitate a dismissal of the case based on double jeopardy
considerations. With these considerations in mind, trial
judges are encouraged to consider carefully the circumstances under which they are about to act, or refrain from
acting, on their own motion. They should conduct all
relevant inquiries into a particular matter before they decide
10

-
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whether or not to make a sua sponte ruling. With the proper
level of well-informed foresight, trial judges can avoid the
pitfalls of sua sponte action.
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